The Playful, the Crazy, and the Nature of Pretense by Miller, Stephen Nachmanovitch
THE PLAYFUL, THE CRAZY, AND THE 
NATURE OF PRETENSE 
by Stephen Nachmanovitch Miller 
0 body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance? 
W. B. Yeats 
I would like to begin by relating a couple of curious observations. I will 
unmethodically state them and then ask you to keep them in the back of 
your mind while we develop some seemingly unconnected ideas on pretense 
and mapping and what they tell us about agreat many other things. 
The first observation comes from learning to conduct an orchestra. There 
you are, surrounded by a large number of musicians who are waiting to play 
a note, and you try to get them all to play together by flapping your arms 
and waving a stick in the air. By experience, you learn to feel what quality 
of motion the stick must have in order to synchronize the players. We 
should notice that orchestral musicians don't have to be deliberately trained 
to  follow conductors. So what do conductors learn? If the orchestra is 
poised to play a note, and you simply drop the baton, all will play the note 
at the instant the baton hits the floor. People know all about gravity; 
through everyday experience with physical objects they develop the expec- 
tations which Newton verbalized in his laws of motion. A conductor exploits 
these expectations. 
The second observation is that people from many very different cultures, 
and even some animals, seem spontaneously to "know" that a balloon is 
something to play with. 
The superficial relationship between these observations is of course that 
when growing up we learn some kind of mapping of how physical objects 
can be expected to  behave. In the first case this is exploited to make a large 
group of people expect the same event at the same time; in the second case 
a toy frustrates or disconfirms those same expectations. But there is more 
to it. 
Mr. Miller is a Ludiologist at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Ludiology is the study 
and practice of foolishness. 
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A Two Ring Circus 
Let us now submerge and do some theorizing. My aim is to show how 
patterns of expectation change, how that which seemed reasonable yester- 
day seems bizarre today, and vice versa. If 1 behave in what you regard as a 
bizarre fashion, you might say that I am being playful or you might say 
that I am crazy. What is really the difference between these two labels? 1 
will approach the matter in the following steps: In this section, 1 will try to 
develop methodically an idea of just what "pretending" means-and to 
show in general that pretending is a ubiquitous and necessary life process. 
Building on this, we can then see a relationship between pretending and 
expectation, and some principles by which systems of expectation, of 
sorting out the events we perceive, change and shift. We can then consider 
what it means to be "crazy" and what it means to be "playful." 
First I want to present a formulation in systemic terms, so that we can 
go on to talk equally well about how pretending and mapping are embodied 
in a wide variety of contexts. 
Since the development of cybernetics, we have learned to look at many 
different processes as feedback loops. Any kind of system that regulates itself 
or that tends toward a goal can be conceptualized as a feedback circuit, 
usually modeled after the thermostat, that most hackneyed example of all 
cybernetic systems. 
In a simple self-corrective system, a machine, function, or process (it 
doesn't matter what; we will denote it by a box) operates on some variable 
V. Information about V is fed back into the machine to regulate or control 
subsequent events. In the case of the thermostat, there is one part of the 
machinery that warms or cools the room, and another part that takes the 
temperature of the room and tells the first part whether or not to keep 
operating. The air temperature, of course, is also part of the thermostat; 
the heater affects the thermostat through the air temperature, making a 
complete circuit: 
thermostat 
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The point I would like to develop is that a system like this cannor work 
in living organisms. If variable V is important to survival, V is useless as 
a source of information to the system that regulates V-because if V 
reaches a harmful level, the system will be impaired in the process of gain- 
ing information on how to operate. 
For example, it is known that a population of animals cannot be safely 
regulated by its food supply. If we have a simple loop, there will be trouble, 
amount 
of food 
available 
population 
growth 
because if the population grows to more than the optimum level for the 
resources available, the result will not be that the excess is killed off by 
starvation, leaving a "proper" amount of healthy survivors; the result will 
be that everyone in the swollen population will suffer from famine. Various 
mechanisms, especially territoriality, have evolved to control population 
before it comes up against the crucial variable of food supply. There is 
nothing intrinsically dangerous about crossing the imaginary boundaries 
of territories-the boundaries are important because they act in place of 
an untenable feedback situation. Or to take another example, blowing up 
balloons is always somewhat risky, because even though with experience 
we can guess from tension when a balloon seems full, we only get a sure 
feedback when we overfill and the balloon pops, and then it is too late to 
correct the situation. 
Thus, as Gregory Bateson points out, "the homeostatic controls of bio- 
logical systems must be activated by variables which are not in themselves 
harmful."! Now if we carry the implications of Bateson's statement a bit 
further, a very neat formulation emerges. Consider our respiration circuitry. 
The purpose of respiration is to make sure that enough oxygen is taken into 
the body. But the body cannot derive its information on how much 0, is 
around from the amount of 0, itself, because that kind of feedback would 
require cells or sensors that signal 0, deficiency; since 0, deficiency makes 
its presence known by impairing cell functioning, such sensors would be 
incapacitated by the very thing they were supposed to measure. What really 
happens is that the body derives its information not from oxygen, but from 
carbon dioxide, which is in itself harmless. There are sensors for CO,. 
In a sense then, CO, excess "stands for" 0, lack, so that the body will 
"know" about a developing oxygen deficiency without having the informa- 
tioncarried by the lethal event itself. 
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When you think about it this is a very simplistic idea. It is the reason 
why, for example, we have distance receptors. We don't bump into walls, 
because we see them first. We don't act (turn away from the wall) because 
of the "real" consequence (physical injury), we act because of our visual 
image of the wall, which itself is quite harmless. 
Thus we are talking about a kind of double feedback loop: 
food supply 
of territory 
populat~on breathing 
control 
This kind of diagram is extremely paradoxical. The outer loop is like the 
old feedback diagram of a thermostat; it represents the flow of information 
about something that the living system in the box needs to control or 
optimize. Moreover, in this sort of loop the information is carried by the 
variable to be controlled-in the thermostat, information about tempera- 
ture is gathered by measuring temperature. The outer loop represents the 
"real"purpose of the system. 
The inner loop represents the flow of information about something 
else, some variable like CO, that does not have real consequences, which 
"stands for" or "represents" the variable (02)  that does have real conse- 
quences. Now this relationship, in which one thing (amount of COz) is a 
representation or mapping of something else (amount of 0,) but without 
the consequences of the latter, is precisely the relationship known as pre- 
tending. So in this context we have a structure that looks like: 
real 
But remember that the outer loop does not exist, while the inner loop 
does! The purpose of breathing is to regulate O2 intake, but in fact there is 
no feedback system that responds to 0 2 ;  there is instead a system that re- 
sponds to C02.  The "pretend" system exists in the body, while the "real" 
system is an abstraction that we observers construct when we ask questions 
about the "purpose" of breathing. 
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Now to turn to the matter of play. In an article 1 wrote, before I thought 
of this feedback business, I said that the question "Why do we play?'(and 
other "why?" questions like it) is really two questions: 1) "Why do we 
possess the capacity to play?" and 2) "Why is so-and-so playing at this 
moment?" These two questions have very different answers. The first 
question has to do with issues such as why did evolution select for play, 
why is play good for us, etc. The answer to this question is that play makes 
us flexible; the reinterpretation of reality or the production of novelty keeps 
us from becoming ossified and unable to deal with a changing world. Play 
enables us to rearrange our capacities so that they can be used in many 
different ways. 
The answer to the second question, the reason that I am playing with 
this snake now, is that it is fun. Fun is one of the most mysterious concepts 
in existence; in psychology, at least, it has been most conspicuously ignored, 
if not feared. Besides, it is no doubt rather obscene to try to "understand" 
fun. 
I sincerely beIieve that there is something obscene about intellectualizing 
play and fun, but my will at its best is flimsy and 1 can't help having a few 
thoughts on the subject. The question of definitions is involved and strange, 
and I will avoid it for the time being (I would just say that I think fun has 
something to do with giving in to the tendency to entropy, rather than 
fighting entropy, which is what the metabolism and organization of living 
organisms seem intended to accomplish). What we can think about at this 
point is the relationship between fun and the so-called "functions" of play 
(adaptive flexibility, etc.). To say that we play for fun but there is play 
because it makes us flexible sounds suspiciously like the idea that we breathe 
in order to maintain CO, level, but breathing exists because we have to 
maintain 0, level. No one who watches a monkey, a baby, or me galumph 
around can say that the player is thinking t o  himself, "Well, I'd better play 
now so 1 can be more flexible and learn faster and . . .." So here is another 
pair of loops, where again the outer loop represents "real purpose" but 
does not exist, whereas the inner loop represents the flow of something 
inconsequential that masquerades as "real purpose," but does exist. 
flexibility 
(fate) 
If pretending involves unhooking something from its consequences, it 
was not unreasonable to label CO, as pretend 0, or sense impressions as 
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pretend injuries. It can also be said that the variables carried on the inner 
loops of the different processes we have been considering tend to "sym- 
bolize" or "map" the nonexistent outer loops that we draw through the 
"real" variables. We can then unleash this monstrous diagram and let it 
gobble up diverse islands of knowledge: 
territorv 
/ / mar, \ \  
events data 
One more feature of this picture has to be mentioned before we can let 
all this gobbling happen. In the earlier paper mentioned above, I discussed 
an aspect of play that I call galumphing. Galumphing can be described as 
a patterned elaboration or complication of a path towards a goal. We 
galumph when we voluntarily set obstacles in our way; when we hop in- 
stead of walk, when we take the scenic route instead of the efficient one, 
when we play a game whose rules demand a limitation of our powers, when 
we are interested in means rather than in ends. This inefficiency is im- 
portantly related to the flexibility function of play, because if we are always 
efficient, we get locked into the momentarily "best" solutions to problems 
and become rigid and ossified. The world of efficiency, of corporations 
and bureaucracies, is a world in which goals are defined and in which one 
has conscious purposes to attain them. 
It is here that we see the intersection between the nature of play and 
Gregory Bateson's very important ideas on the maladaptiveness of con- 
scious purpose.3 Bateson's point is this: Living systems are interconnected 
in circuits, feedback loops, complete cycles, while conscious purpose in- 
volves only an arc of a circuit, a lineal path from a starting place through 
a "means" to a goal. When you apply conscious purpose in an ecosystem 
there is likely to be a dangerous splitting of the system into categories of 
helpful and unhelpful things, which will backfire somewhere. We decide, 
for example, that we want to exclude feces from our lives, on the surface 
quite a harmless goal, so we build a lot of plumbing and machinery to 
carry it away quickly and efficiently. But the thing we excluded finally turns 
up at some distant point in the circuit, say in the water supply. In Bateson's 
terms, wisdom is something immanent in a complete circuit, and when 
linear purpose is applied to an ecosystem, imposing a classification of 
helpful or harmful on elements of the system, wisdom gets replaced by 
clumsy attempts to maximize some visible variable, and the closure and 
stability of the system (whether ecosystem, society, or person) are dis- 
torted and possibly destroyed. 
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Consider the state of medicine today. What happens is that doctors thtnk it would be 
nice to  get rid of polio, or typhoid, or cancer. S o  they devote research money and effort 
to focussing on these "problems" or  purposes. At a certain point Dr. Salk and others 
"soive" the problemof polio. . . . At this point, they stop puttinglarge quantities of effort 
and money into the problem of polio, and go on to the problem of cancer, or whatever it 
maybe ... . 
Consciousness operates in the same way as medicine in its sampling of the events and 
processes of the body and of what goes on in the total m ~ n d .  It IS organized In terms of 
purpose. It is a short-cut device to enable you to  get quickly at  what you want; not to act 
with maximum wisdom in order to live, but to  follow the shortest logical or causal paths 
to get what you next want. [With the addition of modern technology,] conscious purpose 
IS now empowered to upset the balances of the body, of soclety, and of the biological 
world around us. A pathology-a loss of balance-is threatened.4 
Consider domesticated animals and plants. They are genotypically uni- 
form because they are bred for a purpose, unlike wild organisms, who are 
often a genetic hodgepodge. Domesticated organisms are therefore much 
less able to survive changes in the environment. We have to start upsetting 
more and more balances (using predators, insecticides, etc.) in order to pro- 
tect thespecies from its own delicate uniformity. Diversity (and flexibility) are 
bred out in exchange for maximizing certain variables that suit our purpose. 
On a different level the same thing happens in learning. Usually we learn 
specialties at the expense of lability. 
In general, purpose leads to simplicity (streamlining), which leads to a 
loss of options, which leads to instability, which leads to a need for purpose. 
There are many cases in which it is not helpful to intend to  do what you 
do. Try riding a bicycle by making a list of all the movements you have to 
make, in order, and executing them. Try it on soft grass. 
Systems that work, that maintain themselves through self-regulating 
circuitry, are not deliberately seeking the goals that they are designed to 
assure. Societies get along with their environments through the mediation 
of systems of made-up entities that we call cultures; as we shall see later, 
people get along through the mediation of personal mythologies of various 
kinds. With this we can go back to my two-ring circus diagram and see 
some more things. We have already seen why it is dangerous to act directly 
on the outer circle. This is the same as having conscious goals-trying to 
do  the thing that you really need to do. The existence of the inner circle- 
the myth, the pretend, the map-keeps the system from having to do this. 
The system in the box transacts with the inner circle, and things get done 
as long as there is a good mapping relationship between the two circles, as 
long as CO, excess is proportional to 0, loss, as long as a culture's nature 
mythology isa pretty good map of the ecology. 
"Well, yes, we are afraid of witches, but our medicine man 
can handle them. Ne~ther your doctors nor your gods can 
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control your governments, so you have more to fear . . . . 
It is better to die in a famine than in war." 
Anold Hopi who had lived among the whites5 
1 was asked to say something about how play relates to psychiatry. 
Intuitively there is certainly a close relationship between behavior that is 
called playful and behavior that is called crazy: they both involve deviation 
from an audience's expectations or a reinterpretation of "realityv-and at 
first look people distinguish them from each other by some version of the 
question "Are you kidding?'If I act strangely and seem to "really mean 
it," you think I am crazy.6 
In the rest of this paper 1 will examine "are you kidding?" in light of the 
ideas developed in the previous pages. To explore this, let us go back to the 
diagram with the labels: 
A theory is a myth: that is, an organized system of symbols which map and 
unify a field of confusing events. Theories can be manipulated at will while 
data cannot, though theory largely (and often unconsciously) determines 
which data we will be able to perceive and which data we will blind our- 
selves to. 
Psychologists habitually talk about a thing called "self." They dispute 
and experiment over whether it means anything to say that a person has 
one, or more, what it consists of, whether it can be changed, and especially 
whether it would exist if there were no psychologists watching it. The most 
reasonable definition I have seen is Robert Jay Lifton's statement that a 
"self' is a person's symbol of his own organism.' The meaning of this kind 
of idea has been made clearer by mythematician Sybil Meyer, in the notion 
of "personal mythologie~."~ She has shown how a person can map the 
cacophony of a day or a life onto an imaginary framework and thus com- 
prehend it and make it his own, in much the same way that at the cultural 
level myths map the complexity of an ecology. As Meyer shows for personal 
myth and Levi-Strauss shows for cultural myth, we impose on life such 
essentially cognitive structures as binary opposition and mediating symbols 
that act as ways of domesticating or cooking the raw data of events. 
I am proposing to look at personal mythology or "the self' or whatever 
you want to call it as related to the events of life in the same way theory is 
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related to data, and proposing that that relationship has the features of feed- 
back and pretense that were developed on earlier pages. 
We have established some of the characteristics of the theory:data or 
myth:event relationship-we must now ask by what dynamic the relation- 
ship changes. I think two principles are important-two opposing ten- 
dencies: 1) The inertial property: theory has a kind of inertia-it mediates 
vision, so it blurs distinctions that tend to weaken it while sharpening 
distinctions that tend to support it. If events are "understood" by trans- 
action through the myth, events not congenial to the myth are less likely 
to be understood, i.e., they appear as background noise or gibberish. So 
theory is disposed to remain stable in spite of fluctuations in the data. 
2) The adaptive property: Theory means something and aids survival only 
insofar as it maintains its map:territory relationship to data. Since theories 
are in all cases caricatures, it is inevitable that nonsupportive data will 
eventually squeak onto the territory that the theory maps, the outer circle. 
There is pressure on the theory to change or "adaptw-to be a better map 
of the territory. I am reminded here of the old story of Picasso and a dis- 
gruntled man who complained that modern art is not a faithful represen- 
tation of reality. Picasso wanted to know what was. The man produced 
a wallet-sized photo and said, "There! that's a real picture-that's what 
my wife looks like." Picasso looked, and said, "She's awfully small." 
It is essential to the argument of this paper that you remember that the 
theory I am presenting here is also a caricature. 
Before getting down to the level of personal mythology, it is helpful to 
see how these processes are embodied at other levels of system. One process 
that comes to mind here is evolution. Adaptation can be conceived of as 
dealing with two sets of items: 
what the organlsm l~kes 
what isgood for the organlsm (=what he does) 
(With the first set-what is good for the organism-we must consider 
items that may be good for the species but not for the individuals, such as 
altruism.) The contents of the first set keep changing, generally in smalI 
ways, and the organism is said to be adapted to the extent that the second 
set can coincide with the first. In a world where oxygen is good for us, it is 
adaptive to have bodies that enjoy keeping their CO, level down-at least 
as long as the relationship between the two gases remains such that the 
amount of CO, is a reasonable negative map of the amount of 0,. The 
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image here is of the boundary of the first set jiggled around by interface 
with other species, climate, etc., and the second set (largely embodied in 
the genome of the species) chasing after it. Of course when a species (like 
us) acts heavily on its environment, the chasing goes both ways. Now recall 
again the double-loop diagram and in particular the pretend relationship of 
the two circles (a mapping of A onto B with B not having A's consequences). 
Reproduction is good for the species; we like sex. It is good to develop 
flexibility; we like fun. It is good for babies to be protected from predators; 
they like being within a certain optimum distance of mother. 
If we take the discussion down a peg to the cultural level, we see similar 
sorts of things. For example, in some African societies where only lousy 
diets (literally) are available from the environment, a prolonged post-partum 
sex taboo operates to insure the survival of infants by extending the period 
of breast feeding as much as possible. When anthropologists ask women 
the reason for the taboo, the women give a theory that breast milk is 
poisoned by semen, a theory that maps the necessity but is also interlocked 
with the rest of the cultural ~ymbology.~ 
A very clear example of all this is the history of science as described in 
Thomas Kuhn's work on the structure of scientific revolutions.1" A science 
is made comprehensible by a s-ystem of myth (what Kuhn calls a paradigm), 
which encodes the rules of perception by which data are to be assimilated. 
If you ask why bodies fall, you will be told about a helpful but fictional 
thing called gravity. Now, when we get down to the historical level, things 
are changing fast enough for us to  observe the operation of map:territory 
shift. Scientific mythology certainly has the inertial property, reinforced 
by the fact that people who believe in a theory or have invested much of 
themselves in it want to go on believing in it. It is also part of the scientific 
mythology that science ought to have the adaptive property. that it should 
fit the data. What we see historically then is that the territory, the outer 
circle, starts shifting as new data filter in, while the central myth remains 
the same as long as it can afford to and then just a little bit longer. In the 
Ptolemaic phase of astronomy, it was important for many reasons to per- 
petuate the central ideas that the earth is the center of the universe and that 
the heavenly orbs move in perfect circles. Aside from the effect of inertia, 
these beliefs were thoroughly locked into the cultural circuits of religion and 
world view and a great many things other than astronomy. (This is true of 
biological evolution, too-desire for sex may have been adaptive with 
respect to the need to reproduce, but it also is locked into many different 
systems: stabilizing the social group, defusing selfishness, etc.; and these 
interlocking circuits remain even if the primary adaptation drifts away.) 
Motion in perfect circles was damned important in the Middle Ages in 
many spheres of culture. So the basic theory tolerated a great deal of in- 
consistent data in order to maintain itself, was peripherally m6dified in 
horribly complicated ways in order to avoid what from our perspective 
THE PLAYFUL,THE CRAZY,AND THE NATURE OF PRETENSE 41 
seems to be the much simpler, but very central, modification: discarding 
the theory of perfect circles and the stationary earth. But please notice that 
this last sentence is backwards: the medieval astronomers were not shying 
away from a heliocentric theory they didn't like, they simply couldn't con- 
ceive or see such a possibility. Data had to be assimilated into the only 
world-view possible, or it was gibberish. So what happened was that by 
Copernicus's time disconcerting data had accumulated in an enormous heap 
until a crisis was reached and the whole structure came tumbling down. If 
I may be permitted to draw a very silly graph of change through time: 
territory 
In other words, the inertial property of maps creates a backlog such that 
when the map finally adapts, the change is often dramatic-a revolution. 
1 felt a cIeavage in my mind 
Asif my head had split; 
1 tried to match them seam by seam, 
But could not make them fit. 
The thought behind 1 strove to join 
Unto the thought before 
But sequence ravelled out of reach 
Like baits upon a floor. 
Emily Drckinson 
At a still smaller level of system, we finally get back to people's lives and 
their personal mythologies. At this level I think it is things like play and 
insanity, art and love, that have to do with shifts in the relationship of the 
two circles, of myth to event, When people try to differentiate the playful 
from the crazy by asking the question "Are you kidding?'they are asking 
in part about the source of the shift. If you are controlling it, you are kidding; 
if it is controlling you, you are dealing with what is known as a "problem." 
That has a nice sound to it, but what is "it" and how can "it" "control" 
"you"? 
First of all, we can easily get caught in the clutches of our own myths-a 
possibility that has to do with the inertial property; it goes under a wide 
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variety of names. At the interpersonal level Harry Stack Sullivan called it 
the "theorem of escape. . . the self-system from its nature-its communal 
environmental factors, organization, and functional activity-tends to 
escape influence by experience which is incongruous with its current or- 
ganization and functional activity."fI This is part of the reason, for example, 
that psychotherapy is slow-it is necessary to add a great many straws to 
the camel's back before it will break. Or compare again with the history of 
science: the central myth of a science will absorb, ignore, or distort contrary 
evidence for a long time before it (the myth) will change. On yet another 
level, contemporary ethology is showing how predilections of species, such 
as the enjoyment of aggression, often outlive their fittingness to the en- 
vironment. 
It is important to note that this property of inertia is necessarily inherent 
in our diagram. Remember that the inner circle, the myth, is a real circuit, 
a system. As such it has properties of consistency that the territory it maps 
does not have. What passes around the circle in a feedback loop is infor- 
mation. To a thermostat, temperature is information but humidity is not. 
Air temperature is "wired in" to the loop a t  both ends-it is affected by the 
system and it affects the system-so we can correctly say that the other 
parts of the system carry transforms of or information about temperature. 
But it doesn't make any sense to say that the thermostat "represses" infor- 
mation about humidity; it simply cannot "see" the humidity in the first 
place. We can say the same thing about the phenomenon of ignoring and 
distorting disconfirming data. Cognition is a process of projecting or con- 
structing a system of myth or theory onto the external mess. The myth 
supplies the categories and distinctions necessary to handle the data, bur 
any system of symbols can only carry certain kinds of information. This is 
quite the reverse of saying that there is a "censor" which removes unwanted 
information. Such censors are often posited. In the Freudian theory of 
defense mechanisms, your "ego" knows that "you" would not like to "know" 
about some particular thing your "id" is doing, so a process is activated 
(which you don't know about) to clean things up. Or in the cognitive dis- 
sonance theory, which is really quite similar, you know that you wouldn't 
like to know that two things you know are incompatible, so you change 
your knowledge of one of them. Tendencies to get rid of dissonance are 
attributed to a so-called "consistency motive," another kind of reified 
censor. 
One of the most dangerous and instructive experiences you can have is to 
cross a busy street under the influence of LSD. Standing in the middle of 
the road, fascinated by the insects a t  your feet and by the shining chrome of 
the rapidly approaching car, you realize two very important things, and 
then quickly get out of the way. First of all you realize that what you always 
knew to be a street corner was a myth, a theory, a miserly constructed map 
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of a small selection of an expansive and rich territory. Second, you realize 
that this must be so, that otherwise you would never get across the street 
alive, you would never know that that complicated blob over there is your 
friend and will probably be good to you. "Reality" is a name we attribute 
to the fantasies we trust. 
There are times in life when people reach this kind of realization. These 
are the times when personal mythologies are likely to collapse. Consider 
this statement by one of Laing's patients: "I seem to have been living in a 
metaphorical state. I wove a tapestry of symbols and have been living in 
it."'? She said this after she had emerged from a psychosis. She also re- 
ported having thought, during the psychotic period, the same sort of thing 
about her previous life. Now you don't need to have had a doctor accuse 
you of psychosis to experience this. When a revolution takes place (scientific, 
cultural, or personal), we suddenly find it easy to see the pretend or mas- 
querade relationship of the old myth to its territory. We often see this phe- 
nomenon in religious conversions. It is one of the most notorious character- 
istics of mankind that we can see all of the ground but the parts that our 
feet are standing on. We are necessarily looking through some myth that 
provides texture and punctuation to  the perceptual field, but because we 
are looking through it we only recognize it as a myth after it is discarded. A 
myth is called a myth only by a person who is not living in it. 
The collapse of a person's theory of who and where he is can be precipi- 
tated in many ways-by a single piece of data so disparate the theory just 
can't swallow it, a backlog of slow accretions of paradox and contradiction, 
an uprooting from context, a drug, a piece of art. Help! When a piece of 
data cannot be labeled, the theory that generates the labels quakes. It's like 
the punch line of a joke, which explosively compels you to see that the 
theory in light of which you perceived the first part 6f the joke was all 
wrong. But in some cases the joke is not a circumscribed performance; 
sometimes the joke turns out to  be your life. 
What happens when a personal mythology crumbles under the weight of 
a territory it cannot map? A clear possibility is panic. If you learn that you 
cannot trust the theory by means of which you have been perceiving things, 
you are in a sense cast adrift in an ocean of chaotic events. You wildly 
throw an anchor out; and often the first recognizable thing you find is your 
own reaction of panic. A very great danger is the possibility of forming a new 
mythology based on your observations of your own panic. A related danger 
is that of reconstituting a personal mythology around someone else's obser- 
vations of your panic. If you are exhibiting panic and a guardian of society 
happens to be watching, you can be labeled with an official diagnosis. If we 
quite ignore the thorny question of how much validity there is to the label 
"schizophrenia," there still remains the matter of how labeling affects 
people. In the case of someone cut loose from a11 moorings, being told by 
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an authority that what you are is a schizophrenic can amount to being 
handed a new trade to learn. 
Another possibility is to build a new mythology around a thing instead 
of around a map. I mean that the mythology might take the shape of a line 
towards a goal instead of a circuit. This is formally related to the problem 
of conscious purpose; systems of pretense that work are not deliberately 
chasing after their "real goalsw-they are mediative, not instrumental. The 
examples that come to mind have much formal resemblance to cargo cults. 
Cargo cults (and certain forms of neurotic belief, and forms of addiction 
such as the belief that the culture is failing if the Gross National Product is 
not exponentially rising) consist basically of trying to get the benefits of a 
symbolic system out of goal attainment. In the establishment of apocalyptic 
cults, a stable, synchronic mythology is often shattered by invaders (Ameri- 
cans and others in the case of the cargo cults, Romans in the case of Christi- 
anity). A new body of belief springs up involving the attainment of a tangible 
goal, transforming time from a cycle into a march towards an end. The 
cargo will come, the flying saucers will land, the gates of Heaven will open 
and oppression will be reversed by Judgment-we will all be so happy 
there will be nothing left to do; so time will finally stop. 1 am reminded of 
the idea of Liebestod in the myth of Tristan and Isolde. Their pursuit of 
perfect idealized love became synonymous (and interchangeable) with death. 
This kind of myth messes up interpersonal relations quite often: a person 
with a crisis involving the receiving of affection is sometimes seen to stop 
treating love as a process and start treating it as a "thing," a goal to be at- 
tained or conquered, after which nothing need ever happen again. Indeed, 
nothing can ever happen again, because subsequently things could go only 
down-absolute ideals do not admit of circularity, and life will not admit 
anything else. 
Codot 
I 
This is the kind of fallacy that existentialists were put on earth to deal 
with. One of the most dangerous things in life is to try to build a monument 
which you cannot afford to have fall. The myth of Sisyphus seems deadly 
when seen through the myth of progress, but it resembles many more life 
processes than progress does. A person who lives a myth of progress is 
looking forward to an age without oscillation, when things will really settle 
down-this is why the ideal in Tristan can be nothing other than death. 
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Some people who live in this kind of non-circular myth search from place 
to place, lover to lover, job to job, always unhappily finding something 
wrong with them, always looking for a better one, for more, never satiated 
or full because none of these things will stop time, stop life from oscillating. 
Or alternatively, the myth of lineal progress can be lived by taking one's 
way of looking at things and soaking it in formaldehyde. This is known as 
maturity. The idea of maturity, we must remember, was an invention of the 
Industrial Revolution. Efficiency requires that people be predictable and 
not fool around-behavior therefore became categorized as childish or 
mature and in our society there is heavy pressure on people to "act your 
age." The most difficult thing I deal with in teaching classes on play is 
people's terror of appearing silly, of appearing less dignified than they 
"really are." 
There is a feeling that accompanies mythological shifting. Here we must 
dip briefly into the unsavory topic of anxiety. Anxiety is felt at  what we 
might think of as "Ptolemaic" phases in life. That is, when the theory wants 
to remain the same but is under pressure from contradictory data. We 
should consider H. S. Sullivan's description: he thinks that anxiety is a 
derivation of a primeval kind of unpleasantness in infancy that differentiates 
into fear and anxiety.13 Fear and anxiety are distinguished from each 
other in that fear refers to an identifiable object or person, while anxiety 
refers to relationship between people. You fear burglars; you are anxious 
when in church. Anxiety refers to a context, a set of interconnections; in 
the language of this paper we say that you are anxious when the mythology 
that mediates your integration into a context is shaky. Sullivan speculates 
that the primitive emotion he talks about appears in later life under very 
rare circumstances; he calls it the "uncanny emotion"; he relates it to awe, 
or dread; and he thinks it can be recognized in the early stages of schizo- 
phrenia, sometimes under the influence of art, etc. He talks about feeling 
that your skin is crawling, and that on occasions of experiencing uncanny 
feelings "it is as if the world were in some way different." He also talks about 
two different sorts of needs: satisfaction, which (like fear) deals with things; 
and security, which (like anxiety) deals with relationship. 
"It is as if the world were in some way different"; this is, in the sense 1 
have been developing here, exactly what is happening. When the theory 
that mediates our vision collapses, what we see of the world is different. If 
we were thermostats who "saw" temperature, and were forced to discard 
our theory of operation and "see" humidity instead, it would be proper to 
say that we were now living in a different world. This may be why Sullivan 
identified the uncanny emotion with the very young-their world, in this 
sense, changes often. 
Since anxiety does not deal with "things" it cannot be dealt with instru- 
mentally, in the sense that we can at least know how to remove ourselves 
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from a thing that frightens us. But relationships are embodied in things, 
and it is possible to commit the fallacy of thinking that a thing which partici- 
pates in a relationship that causes anxiety is itself what is crucial. Thus a 
person lacking security might crave the tangible accouterments of power. 
This brings us back to the cargo cult business, the turning of a feedback 
loop, of a cycle, into a lineal pursuit of a goal. Thus we might see some 
sense in the observation that historically anxiety was an experience to 
which there were few references during such periods as Classical Greece 
and the Middle Ages, when cultural myths were stable and fairly satisfactory 
maps; and to which there were many references by people living in transi- 
tional times of mythological shakeup and realignment (Alexandrian Greece, 
the twentieth century).'4 Compare the music of Handel or the novels of 
Henry Fielding-works whose conflicts are framed within a context of 
grace and equanimity-with the beautiful but tortured and uncertain 
works of artists like Mahler or Hesse. 
To sum up what the nature of theory:data relationships has to do with 
pathology of personality or culture, we can say this: we need to use a tool- 
mythology, theory, map, eyeglasses, caricature-in order to perceive the 
world and deal with it, but the tool in many of its versions has characteristics 
that land us in a situation where it uses us. We can find ourselves wearing 
eyeglasses made out of flypaper; they stick and it really hurts to take them 
off. 
This brings up the question of how our myths are kept from getting too 
stubborn, which brings us back to play. 
"Wallo, Rabbit," said Pooh, "is that you?" 
"Let's pretend it isn't," said Rabb~t ,  "and see what happens." 
"I've got a message for you." 
"I'llgive it to him."' 
A. A. Milne 
How can "you" "control" the shifts of myth:event? What we suggested 
before was that the playful and the crazy deal with the borderline between 
being in control and being out of control, but in play being in control is the 
frame within which you may be safely out of control. We have to look 
closely at framing, which is the creation of a context for something. To do 
this, let us consider pretending again. Earlier I made a formal and unusual 
use of the word by saying that the inner circle has a relation of pretense to 
the outer circle. What about the more ordinary and recognizable embodi- 
ments of this relation? 
There was a famous case that Freud described in Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle. A little boy of a year and a half dealt with the fact that his mother 
would go away at various times, by going off to play with a reel tied to a 
piece of string. He would repeatedly throw the reel away and then pull it 
back, shouting "gone" and then "there." Freud's interpretation was that 
the baby, who could not control the times of his mother's departures and 
arrivals, compensated by inventing a game in which he controlled arrivals 
and departures himself. This use of play (and in later life of fantasy) is not 
uncommon; we often see children repeating with dolls or in other kinds of 
play interpersonal events that they could not control. We see here the 
building of myth-these games have all the characteristics of the inner 
feedback circles that were developed in the abstract model in the first part 
of this paper: they are circular, they can safely be manipulated, they are 
cut off from the consequences of the "real thing," yet they are reasonable 
"maps" of the real thing. 
Vygotsky in 1933 conjured up a nice way of talking about what goes on 
in children's overt pretending.15 A kid builds a world of interpretation 
around some object that Vygotsky calls a pivot. A pivot might be a stick 
which is interpreted as a horse, and this interpretation sets up a context in 
which surrounding objects too are now perceived in the light of the horse 
situation. The meaning of horse is severed from real horses and transferred 
to the stick. What we have again is the voluntary manipulation of myth. 
Let us backtrack and reach this point again by way of a different path.16 
In information theory, "noise" is a random component of communication 
that does not relate to  the pattern being signaled; and "signal" is what is 
carried on feedback loops-information about deviations from pattern or 
"redundancy." Noise in a communication is variety which is classified as 
irrelevant by the receiver; if two people are simultaneously talking to you 
at a party, one conversation becomes "signal" and the other "noise," but 
you decide which is which. To go back to the question of "personality" 
again, a person decides with greater or lesser awareness that some of the 
messages he generates are signal (self-concept) and some are noise (irrele- 
vant). 
Noise can be found, or it can be made. Noise can be found in running 
across an undecipherable piece of data, in novelty, during exploration. One 
of the ways of defining play is to say that it is the deliberate creation o f  
noise, while art (and scientific revolution, and good therapy) uses that 
noise to build new systems of assumptions. 
The word "novelty" is often used in connection with play. I think people 
really mean noise, of which novelty is a subset. There is a need for noise in 
life, involved with the important emotion of boredom. The thing about 
noise is that it can come from either novel sources or familiar sources. You 
can make noise in the first way by simply introducing something from out- 
side the system. The ubiquity of this principle is seen in sexual reproduction 
(for species) and exogamy (for cultures) and exploration (for individuals); 
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in these cases a system perpetuates itself by incorporating pieces of other 
systems. 
You can also make noise in the second way, not by adding anything new 
but by changing the boundaries of the system: 
creating a new context around a familiar thing. You pivot a horse-context 
around a stick and off you go into the sunset. Play (and this is why play is 
different from exploration) comes less often in the form of experiencing a 
novel object and more often in the form of reinterpreting something familiar 
so that you make it novel; your system of perceptual biases changes. 
The simple situation of finding noise involves new data which breaks 
expectations but does not modify the myth.Sometimes 1 have the experience 
of picking up a large milk carton that I expect to be full, and it turns out to 
be almost empty. There is surprise and discovery as the arm shoots up into 
the air, of course, because the muscles were braced to exert a much larger 
force than necessary. I may laugh, but I'm certainly not playing. Similarly, 
we can only enjoy a steak, but we can have.fun with words." Play cannot 
be a passive intake of novelty; you must be able to act on the novelty or 
actively pervert the known or expected until it looks new. 
But when we pivot an "imaginary" context, a new texture of expectation, 
around our stick, we are giving ourselves some elbow room. As human 
beings we have the extraordinary capacity to know that our words are 
words, and not the things they represent; that our interpretations are inter- 
pretations, that our theories are theories. But there are times when we do 
not, times when We cannot, times when we cannot afford to, exercise this 
capacity. Remember the LSD example-it is oJien extremelv adaptive to 
be unconscious of the.fact that your perception is mediated by a myth. But 
if we never pretend, never reinterpret things, especially if we live in a culture 
THE PLAYFUL,THE CRAZY, AND THE NATURE O F  PRETENSE 49 
or context where events, people, things-the data of experience-are 
changing and straining the assimilative capacities of our theories, there is 
the danger of painting ourselves into a corner, of being controlled by our 
theories often at the cost of much hurt. 
When we intercalate play or imagination with life, we are living in dif- 
ferent "worlds" of interpretation at different times. There is a paradoxical 
dual nature to the ability to know that your myth is a myth, corresponding 
to the converse of the inertial and adaptive dynamics by which myth:event 
relationships shift. Play is creative in that we make for ourselves more 
mythological or interpretive elbow room, and it is destructive in that the 
conventions and expectations by which people get along are contradicted. 
Throughout the world this duality is embodied in traditions of sacred 
clowns and fools. This is especially true of the Trickster mythology and the 
association of sanctity and buffoonery that was so widespread in North 
American Indian cultures,~8 Trickster was at the same time the creator of 
culture and the shameless violator of all of society's laws. 
Here is Wakdjunkaga [the Winnebago Trickster figure] pretending to be thoroughly 
socialized and about to  embark on a warparty. But let me tell you what he really is: a n  
utter fool, a breaker of the most holy taboos, a destroyer of the most sacred objects!ly 
Wakdjunkaga commits one unspeakable violation after another, and yet 
this capacity also enables him to see otherwise than through the spectacles 
of culture-to incorporate noise into culture and thus be its creator. 
From there on he continued alone. He ambled along cal l~ng all the objects In the world 
younger brothers when speaking to them. He and all the objects in the world understood 
one another, understood, indeed, one another's language. 
It was the embodiment of this duality and paradox, the same creative- 
destructive paradox which I think characterizes play and madness, that made 
Trickster such an incredibly sacred figure. 
The most important statement about the nature of perception that 1 have 
yet seen was made by Don Juan, the Yaqui sorcerer Carlos Castaneda wrote 
about. After years of trying to overcome his Western skepticism, Castaneda 
genuinely experienced by himself some of the uncanny things that previously 
were either hearsay or attributable to drugs. Castaneda returned to Don 
Juan now prepared to believe in his new mythology, his new way of looking 
at the world. But Don Juan was not that facile-he knew the difference 
between map and territory: 
Perhaps you now know that seeing happens only when one sneaks between the worlds, 
the world of ordinary people and the world of sorcerers . . . . Yesterday you believed the 
coyote talked to  you. Any sorcerer who doesn't see would believe the same, but one who 
sees knows that to believe that is to be pinned down in the realm of sorcerers. By the same 
token, not to believe that coyotes talk is to be pinned down in the realm of ordinary men.10 
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I think we can now dredge up the two observations I planted at the be- 
ginning of this paper and look at them again. 
Music, especially great music, is full of surprises and ambiguities. When 
a conductor exploits people's intuitions about motion, he makes the am- 
biguities seem lawful; he adjusts the expectations, and if he is good even the 
breathing, of his musicians so that the surprises wiIl be inevitable to them. 
What a balloon does to people in exploiting their intuitions about motion 
is the opposite-it is a real physical object and does obey laws, but the laws 
of air resistance are not often "seen" by people because most familiar objects 
are dominated by the law of gravity, and we so often perceive with an atti- 
tude of gravity, A balloon makes inevitable events surprising. 
The two situations are both mappings of the way objects behave; each 
has a field of vision and a field of blindness, 
When we try to differentiate the playful from the crazy by some trans- 
form of the question "Are you kidding?" we must remember that "kidding" 
means a kind of mapping, a patterned transformation between two worlds 
of vision. 
We recognize in the behavior of a balloon a mediation between order 
and unpredictability. 
Inevitability and surprise are necessary correctives to each other. If 
everything is inevitable we are turned to stone, rigid and inflexible. If every- 
thing is surprising we live in a world of chaos, mad. We have to keep a foot 
in each world. If that sounds too abstract, it can be translated: Do some- 
thing foolish today. 
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